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Abstract
As a powerful cryptanalysis tool, the method of return-map attacks can be used to extract secret
messages masked by chaos in secure communication schemes. Recently, a simple defensive mechanism was
presented to enhance the security of chaotic parameter modulation schemes against return-map attacks.
Two techniques are combined in the proposed defensive mechanism: multistep parameter modulation and
alternative driving of two different transmitter variables. This paper re-studies the security of this proposed
defensive mechanism against return-map attacks, and points out that the security was much over-estimated
in the original publication for both ciphertext-only attack and known/chosen-plaintext attacks. It is found
that a deterministic relationship exists between the shape of the return map and the modulated parameter,
and that such a relationship can be used to dramatically enhance return-map attacks thereby making them
quite easy to break the defensive mechanism.
1 Introduction
In the past two decades, chaotic systems have been extensively used to construct cryptosystems in either analog
[A´lvarez et al., 1999; Yang, 2004] or digital [Li, 2003] forms. Most analog implementations are secure commu-
nication systems based on synchronization of the sender and the receiver chaotic systems [Pecora & Carroll,
1990], where the signal is transmitted over a public channel from the sender to drive the receiver for achiev-
ing synchronization and message decryption. Some different encryption structures have been proposed:
chaotic masking [Kocarev et al., 1992; Murali & Lakshmanan, 1994; Morgul & Feki, 1999], chaotic switch-
ing or chaotic shift keying (CSK) [Parlitz et al., 1992; Dedieu et al., 1993; Parlitz & Ergezinger, 1994], chaotic
modulation [Wu & Chua, 1993; Yang & Chua, 1996; Parlitz et al., 1996], and the inverse system approach
[Feldmann et al., 1996]. At the same time, many different cryptanalysis methods have also been developed
to break the proposed chaos-based secure communication systems: return-map attacks [Pe´rez & Cerdeira,
1995; Zhou & Chen, 1997; Yang et al., 1998c; Li et al., 2005b], nonlinear prediction based attacks [Short,
1994, 1997; Zhou & Lai, 1999], spectral analysis attacks [Yang et al., 1998a; A´lvarez & Li, 2004a], generalized
synchronization (GS) based attacks [Yang et al., 1998b; A´lvarez et al., 2005a, 2004b], short-time period based
attacks [Yang, 1995; A´lvarez & Li, 2004b], parameter identification based attacks [Stojanovski et al., 1996;
Tao et al., 2003; Vaidya & Angadi, 2003; A´lvarez et al., 2004a], and so on.
Given the existence of so many different attacks, it has become a real challenge to design highly secure chaos-
based communication systems against all known attacks. Three general countermeasures have been proposed
in the literature: 1) using more complex dynamical systems, such as high-dimensional hyperchaotic systems or
multiple cascaded (heterogeneous) chaotic systems [Grassi & Mascolo, 1999a; Murali, 2000; Yao et al., 2003];
2) introducing traditional ciphers into the chaotic cryptosystems [Yang et al., 1997; Grassi & Mascolo, 1999b;
Lian et al., 2003]; 3) introducing an impulsive (also named sporadic) driving signal instead of a continuous
signal to realize synchronization [Yang & Chua, 1997; He et al., 2000; Khadra et al., 2003]. The first counter-
measure has been found insecure against some attacks [Short & Parker, 1998; Zhou & Lai, 1999; Huang et al.,
2001; Tao et al., 2003], and some security defects of the second countermeasure have also been reported
[Parker & Short, 2001], but the last one has not yet been cryptanalyzed to date.
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Besides the above three general countermeasures, there also exist some specially-designed countermeasures
that can be used to resist certain attacks. This paper studies two such countermeasures, recently proposed
by Palaniyandi & Lakshmanan [2001], against return-map attacks. These two proposed countermeasures are
multistep parameter modulation and alternative driving of transmitter variables, which have been combined
to construct a new secure communication scheme for binary signal transmissions. After refining return-map
attacks via a deterministic relationship between the return map and a parameter bs, we found that the
security of the first countermeasure was much over-estimated in [Palaniyandi & Lakshmanan, 2001], and that
the combination of the two countermeasures can be easily separated in some way so as to disable the second
countermeasure. The aforementioned deterministic relationship between the return map and the parameter
bs is reported in this paper, for the first time in the literature, which is useful not only for engineering studies
on chaos-based secure communications but also for theoretical studies on the dynamics of chaotic systems.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, a brief introduction to return-map attacks
and related countermeasures is given. Section 3 re-evaluates the security of the multistep parameter modulation
scheme, by exploiting a deterministic relationship between the shape of the return map and the modulated
parameter bs. The original return-map attack proposed by Pe´rez & Cerdeira [1995] will be enhanced. In Sec.
4, cryptanalysis of the scheme of alternative driving of transmitter variables is studied in detail. The last
section concludes the paper.
2 Return-Map Attacks and Related Countermeasures
The return-map attack method was first proposed by Pe´rez & Cerdeira [1995] to break chaotic switching
(binary parameter modulation) and chaotic masking schemes based on the Lorenz system, which was then
studied by Yang et al. [1998c] to break chaotic masking, switching and non-autonomous modulation schemes
based on Chua’s circuit. In [Zhou & Chen, 1997], the return-map attack method was also used to break a
DCSK scheme based on a discrete-time chaotic map [Parlitz & Ergezinger, 1994]. Without loss of generality,
this paper will focus on the attack scheme of Pe´rez & Cerdeira on the Lorenz system thereby demonstrating
how the return map is constructed and how the attack works to break a typical chaotic switching scheme
proposed in [Cuomo & Openheim, 1993].
Consider the following Lorenz system used as the sender:
x˙s = σ(ys − xs),
y˙s = rsxs − ys − xszs, (1)
z˙s = xsys − bszs,
where σ, bs, r are system parameters, and the value of bs is modulated by m(t), the digital plain-signal for
secure transmission, as follows:
bs =
{
b0, m(t) = 0,
b1, m(t) = 1.
To transmit m(t) to the receiver end, a variable of the sender system, such as xs, is sent out, which will be
used to induce synchronization of the receiver system, resulting in:
x˙r = σ(yr − xr),
y˙r = rrxs − yr − xszr, (2)
z˙r = xsyr − brzr,
where br = b0. When m(t) = 0, the intended synchronization can be reached, while when m(t) = 1, the
synchronization error always remains at a certain finite order. Then, it is easy to decode the secret signal
m(t) by checking the power energy (xr − xs)
2 with a digital filter. Following Cuomo & Openheim [1993], the
parameters are set as σ = 16, r = 45.6, b0 = 4.0 and b1 = 4.4.
However, the above chaotic switching scheme can be easily broken with the return map constructed from
xs as pointed out in [Pe´rez & Cerdeira, 1995]. Assuming that Xm and Ym are the m-th maxima and m-th
minima of xs, respectively, define the following four variables: Am =
Xm+Ym
2 , Bm = Xm−Ym, Cm =
Xm+1+Ym
2 ,
Dm = Ym −Xm+1, and then construct two return maps, (Am vs Bm) and (−Cm vs −Dm), as shown in Fig.
1. The two maps are actually equivalent to each other, so we only consider the map (Am vs Bm) in this
paper. Note that there are three segments in the return map, and each segment is further split into two
strips. It is obvious that the split of the map is caused by the switching of the value of bs between b0 and
b1. Thus, by checking which strip the point (Am, Bm) falls on, one can easily unmask the current value of the
digital signal m(t). Since one has to assign either 0-bit or 1-bit to a strip in each segment, it was claimed in
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Figure 1: The return maps constructed for a typical chaotic switching scheme.
[Pe´rez & Cerdeira, 1995] that there are only seven chances to make wrong assignments, which can be easily
detected by observing the waveform of the reconstructed digital signal m(t).
In recent years, some different countermeasures have been proposed to resist the above return-map attack.
In [Bu & Wang, 2004], a periodic signal g0(t) = A cos(ωt+φ0) is combined with zs to modulate the transmitted
signal xs so as to blur the reconstructed return map in order to frustrate the attacker. However, soon it
was broken as reported in [Chee et al., 2004; Wu et al., 2004; A´lvarez et al., 2005b] via distinguishing the
parameters ω, φ0 and removing the modulating signal. A modified scheme of the original method of Bu & Wang
[2004] was proposed in [Wu et al., 2004] to further improve its security. Our recent work shows that this
modified modulating scheme is still not secure enough [Li et al., 2005a] and that the modulating signal can
still be effectively removed via parameters estimation.
In [Palaniyandi & Lakshmanan, 2001], two new countermeasures were proposed and combined to enhance
the security of chaotic switching schemes against return-map attacks. The first countermeasure is to increase
the number of strips by modulating bs between 2n different values: b0,1, · · · , b0,n and b1,1, · · · , b1,n, where
b0,1, · · · , b0,n correspond to m(t) = 0 and b1,1, · · · , b1,n correspond to m(t) = 1. This countermeasure is
called multistep parameter modulation, and accordingly the original two-valued chaotic switching scheme is
called single-step parameter modulation. It was claimed that the chances to make wrong assignments become
(22n− 2)3− 1 ≈ 26n and that the security against return-map attacks is dramatically enhanced even when n is
not too large. Figure 2 shows the return map constructed from xs when the multistep parameter modulation
is used, where n = 5 and b0,i ∈ {3.2, 3.4, 3.6, 3.8, 4.0}, b1,i ∈ {3.1, 3.3, 3.5, 3.7, 3.9}. It can be seen that
each segment is split into 2n = 10 strips. The second countermeasure is to alternatively use xs and ys
as the driving signal to force the receiver system to synchronize with the sender, which will further split
the constructed return map into two parts: one corresponds to the map from xs and another to the map
from ys, as shown in Fig. 3
1. It can be seen that two segments of the xs-map and the ys-map largely
overlap each other. In a multistep parameter modulation system, the receiver contains 2n different driven
sub-systems, which are used to realize synchronization for the 2n different values of bs, respectively. When
alternative driving is also applied, the number of sub-systems is doubled to be 4n, among which 2n correspond
to xs-driving synchronization and another 2n to ys-driving synchronization. For more details about the two
countermeasures, see [Palaniyandi & Lakshmanan, 2001].
3 Re-Evaluating the Security of Multistep Parameter Modulation
The security of multistep parameter modulation relies on the fact that the attacker has to assign 0-bits or
1-bits for all strips in the return map. Since there are 6n stripes in total, the success probability to make a
right assignment is 126n , i.e., the attack complexity is 2
6n. Note that the above analysis on the security is more
rigorous, from the cryptographical point of view, than the one given in [Palaniyandi & Lakshmanan, 2001],
where the latter enumerated the number of making wrong assignments under the assumption that the first
assignment is correct. Of course, the order of the estimated attack complexity is the same.
1Different from xs, there exist some small fluctuations in ys. The faked maxima and minima induced by the small fluctuations
should be removed from the return map; otherwise, the map will become completely meaningless. For the return map plotted in
Fig. 3, therefore, if the difference between two consecutive maxima and minima is less than 1, they will be omitted.
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Figure 2: The return map constructed from xs in multistep parameter modulation.
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Figure 3: The return map constructed in multistep parameter modulation with alternative xs/ys driving.
The above security estimation is based on the assumption that all 6n strips are independent of each other.
However, we found that this assumption is not true and that there exists a deterministic relationship between
the positions of the strips and the 2n different values of the modulated parameter bs, and this relationship
will dramatically reduce the attack complexity in all attacking scenarios. In Fig. 4a, the two return maps
corresponding to bs = 3 and bs = 4 respectively are plotted to show such a deterministic relationship. One
can see that the three segments corresponding to bs = 3 are closer to the origin, while the three segments
corresponding to bs = 4 are farther. This means that there exist only two possibilities to assign the 0/1-bits
to all strips in the chaotic switching scheme (see Fig. 1): for all three segments, assign 0-bit (or 1-bit) to the
strip closer to the origin and 1-bit (or 0-bit) to the other one. If the relationship between b0 and b1 is also
known to the attacker, he can uniquely determine the right assignment to completely break the plain-signal.
Apparently, the above analysis can be easily generalized to multistep parameter modulation. Figure 4b shows
the return maps corresponding to the 10 different values of bs used in [Palaniyandi & Lakshmanan, 2001]. It
can be seen that Fig. 4b is almost identical with the return map shown in Fig. 2a. Thus, it is easy to mark
each strip of the return map shown in Fig. 2a with one of the 2n = 10 possible values of bs. For example,
for Segment 1 shown in Fig. 2b, the i-th strip corresponds to bs = 3.0 + 0.1i. This means that the task
of assigning 0/1-bits to 6n strips is changed to another equivalent task of assigning 0/1-bits to 2n different
values of bs. Considering that there are n values corresponding to 0-bits and other n values to 1-bits, one can
easily deduce that the number of all possible bit assignments is 2 ·
(
2n
n
)
= 2 · (2n)!(n!)2 , which is O
(
22n√
n
)
when
n≫ 1 following Stirling’s approximation [Weisstein, 2004b]. As a conclusion, the attack complexity is always
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much smaller than O
(
26n
)
, the original complexity estimated in [Palaniyandi & Lakshmanan, 2001]. Table
1 shows a comparison of the two complexities. From the cryptographical point of view, based on today’s
computer technology, a practically secure cryptosystem should have a complexity of order O
(
2100
)
[Schneier,
1996], which requires n ≥ 50 following the data shown in Table 1. However, in this case, 4n ≥ 200 sub-
systems have to be constructed to realize the decryption of the transmitted digital signal m(t), which makes
the implementation too costly for most practical applications. If the security can be relaxed to order of 250,
4n ≥ 32 sub-systems are enough to be practical in some applications (though still much more costly than
other chaos-based secure communication systems). Note that the implementation cost will be acceptable in
practice, if all the sub-systems can be realized with the same chaotic circuit.
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Figure 4: A deterministic relationship between the return map and the modulated parameter bs.
Table 1: A comparison of the real complexity 2 ·
(
2n
n
)
and the over-estimated complexity 26n.
n 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
2 ·
(
2n
n
)
≈ 214.7 218.5 222.4 226.3 230.2 234.1 238 247.8 257.7 267.6 277.5 287.4 297.3
26n 248 260 272 284 296 2108 2120 2150 2180 2210 2240 2270 2300
Note that one can extract some right bits even with a wrong bit assignment. For instance, for the example
given in [Palaniyandi & Lakshmanan, 2001], 1-bits are assigned to bs ∈ {3.1, 3.3, 3.5, 3.7, 3.9} and 0-bits to
bs ∈ {3.2, 3.4, 3.6, 3.8, 4.0}, so one can get about 80% of right bits with the following bit assignment: 1-bits
are assigned to bs ∈ {3.1, 3.3, 3.5, 3.7,4.0}, and 0-bits to bs ∈ {3.2, 3.4, 3.6, 3.8,3.9}, where the bold values
correspond to wrong bits. Generally speaking, if there are 2i values corresponding to wrong bits, the bit error
ratio (BER) at the attacker end will be i/n, i.e., the probability to get right bits is 1− (i/n). Note that when
i < n/2, the attacker can simply flip all assigned bits to get a lower BER (n− i)/n = 1− (i/n). From such a
point of view, the worst bit assignment occurs when i = ⌊n/2⌋ or ⌈n/2⌉. Considering that the bit assignment
can be regarded as an equivalent of the secret key, the above fact means that the decryption of multistep
parameter modulation is insensitive to the mismatch of the secret key. However, such an insensitivity does not
reduce the attack complexity by too much, since the number of wrong assignments corresponding to i = ⌊n/2⌋
or ⌈n/2⌉ is in the same order as the complexity O
(
22n√
n
)
when n ≫ 1: the number is 2 ·
(
n
⌊n/2⌋
)
·
(
n
n−⌊n/2⌋
)
=
2 ·
(
n
⌊n/2⌋
)
·
(
n
⌈n/2⌉
)
≈ O
(
22n
n
)
, which is not much smaller than O
(
22n√
n
)
.
In cryptography, there are many different attacking scenarios [Schneier, 1996]. A cryptographically secure
cryptosystem should be immune to all kinds of attacks. The above attack complexity of multistep parameter
modulation is for the simplest attack – the ciphertext-only attack, where the attacker can only observe some
ciphertexts. When some other attacking scenarios are available, the security of multistep parameter modulation
will be dramatically downgraded.
Now, let us consider the security against known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks, where the attacker
can get or choose some plaintexts to carry out the attacks. Such attacks are feasible in some real applications
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and become more and more common in the digital networked world today. In known/chosen-plaintext attacks,
it is obvious that the knowledge about some plaintexts means the knowledge about the bit assignment of
the 6n strips: when m(t) = 0 (or 1), one immediately knows that the strip on which a point (Am, Bm) lies
corresponds to a 0-bit (or 1-bit), and then knows that other two strips marked with the same value of bs also
correspond to 0-bits (or 1-bits). That is, he can assign a 0-bit (or 1-bit) to the value of bs corresponding to
the distinguished strip. Once n 0-bits (or 1-bits) have been assigned to n different values of bs, the attacker
can directly assign 1-bits (or 0-bits) to all other undetermined values so as to complete the attack. For the
number of required known/chosen plain-bits in the above attack, we have the following theoretical result.
Theorem 1 Assume that bs distributes uniformly over the set of 2n values and that any two values of bs
are independent of each other. Then, the average number of required known/chosen plain-bits in the above
known/chosen-plaintext attack is 3n.
Proof : Denote the k(≥ 1) known/chosen plain-bits by B1, · · · , Bk ∈ {0, 1}, and the corresponding values of
bs by b
(1)
s , · · · , b
(k)
s . The condition that the attack is completed for the k known/chosen plain-bits equals to
the following term: n− 1 values corresponding to 0-bits (or 1-bits) have occurred in b
(1)
s , · · · , b
(k−1)
s , and b
(k)
s
is the first occurrence of the last value. Considering that each value occurs with a uniform probability p = 12n
and any two values are independent of each other, it is easy to get the probability that the attack stops with
k known/chosen plain-bits, P (k), as follows:
P (k) =
{
0, k < n
p(1− p)k−n, k ≥ n.
(3)
Substituting k′ = k − n into the above equation, one can get P (k′) = p(1 − p)k
′
, ∀k′ ≥ 0. It is obvious that
P (k′) obeys a geometric distribution, and one can immediately deduce that E(k′) = p−1 = 2n [Weisstein,
2004a]. That is, E(k) = E(k′ + n) = E(k′) + n = 3n. The proof is thus completed. 
Since n cannot be too large to make the cryptosystem practical in real applications, the above theorem
shows that multistep parameter modulation is not sufficiently secure against known/chosen-plaintext attacks.
In Fig. 5, we give an example of known/chosen-plaintext attacks. It can be seen that three different values of
bs, i.e., nine strips in the return map, are successfully distinguished with only three known/chosen plain-bits.
4 Breaking Alternative Driving of Transmitter Variables
In this section, we consider how to break another countermeasure – alternative driving of transmitter variables.
Following the example given in [Palaniyandi & Lakshmanan, 2001], we focus on the x/y-driving of the Lorenz
system. Although the alternative driving can make the return map less clearer by introducing overlaps of
the xs-map and the ys-map, it is found that the two overlapped sub-maps can be easily separated so that an
attack can be carried out on the two sub-maps separately.
Since there are only two possible driving signals, the separation of the two driving signals can be simplified
to the problem of detecting the times at which the driving signal, denoted by ds here, changes from xs to ys or
from ys to xs. This can be easily done by observing the differentiations of ds, since the alternative driving will
introduce breaking points at each switching time (i.e., discontinuities in ds). Considering that chaotic signals
xs(t) and ys(t) are both continuous, the switching times can be easily distinguished from sudden and large
differentiations of ds, where the word “sudden” means that the differentiation at a time t is much larger than the
others around it. In Fig. 6, the first-order, second-order, 4th-order and 8th-order discrete-time differentiations
of ds are shown for demonstration, where the display range on the y-axis is always limited within [−20, 20] to
emphasize some sudden and large changes of differentiations with relatively small amplitudes. It can be seen
that all switching times are sufficiently prominent in the 8th-order differentiations. Once the switching times
are detected, one can easily separate the xs-map and the ys-map to break the multistep parameter modulation
as discussed in the last section.
In fact, it is even possible to directly separate the two sub-maps without calculating differentiations of ds.
Observing Fig. 3, one can find that the overlaps of the two sub-maps are not very significant, which makes it
possible to separate the two sub-maps directly from the alignment directions of consecutive points (Am, Bm).
When xs-driving is used for odd bits and ys for even bits, Fig. 7 shows the positions of the points (Am, Bm)
in the return map for 0 ≤ t ≤ 30. In spite of the existence of a few error points and ambiguous points,
which are mainly introduced by the faked maxima and minima near the switching times, it is still very easy to
distinguish which driving signal was used from the alignment direction of the points (Am, Bm) corresponding
to the current bit (i.e., to the current value of bs). The accidental errors and ambiguous points can be easily
removed by filtering techniques.
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Figure 5: The known/chosen-plaintext attack to multistep parameter modulation, when 10 ≤ t ≤ 30. Legend:
3 – 0 ≤ t ≤ 10, m(t) = 1, bs = 3.5; # – 10 ≤ t ≤ 20, m(t) = 1, bs = 3.3; 2 – 20 ≤ t ≤ 30, m(t) = 0, bs = 3.4.
Finally, we examine the attack complexity when both countermeasures are used in a secure communication
system. Since there exist 12n strips, the average number of plain-bits in known/chosen-plaintexts attacks will
be 2 ·3n = 6n, which means that the security against known/chosen-plaintext attacks is still rather weak. The
security against ciphertext-only attacks is relatively higher:
(
2 ·
(
2n
n
))2
. However, note that an attacker can
extract 50% of all plain-bits, even when he only exhaustively guesses the right bit assignment corresponding to
the xs-map or the ys-map. Thus, strictly speaking, the security against ciphertext-only attacks is still in the
order of 2 ·
(
2n
n
)
, i.e., the same as the one under the condition that only the first countermeasure is used. As
mentioned above, to make the designed secure communication system sufficiently secure, n ≥ 50 is required.
5 Conclusion
To resist the return-map attack presented in [Pe´rez & Cerdeira, 1995], Palaniyandi & Lakshmanan [2001] pro-
posed two countermeasures to enhance the security of the chaotic switching (i.e., binary parameter modulation)
scheme. After refining the return-map attack by exploiting a deterministic relationship between the return map
and the modulated parameter, this paper points out that these two countermeasures are not secure enough
against known/chosen-plaintext attacks. Also, it is found that the security against ciphertext-only attacks
cannot be ensured if the proposed secure communication system contains less than 200 sub-systems.
The cryptanalysis results given in this paper show that one has to use more powerful techniques to effectively
resist return-map attacks. Recently, a new CSK scheme was proposed in [Xu & Chee, 2004] by introducing
many false switching events. It is under study whether or not this new CSK scheme is secure against the
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return-map attack described in this paper. At present, it is still an open problem to design a chaos-based
secure communication system that is strong enough against all known attacks, and to find more powerful
cryptanalysis tools to evaluate the security of various chaos-based cryptosystems.
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